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One of the symptoms of trauma is said to be a “sense of foreshortened future.” Without
further qualification, it is not clear how to interpret this. In this paper, we offer a
phenomenological account of what the experience consists of. To do so, we focus on the
effects of torture.We describe how traumatic events, especially those that are deliberately
inflicted by other people, can lead to a loss of “trust” or “confidence” in the world. This
undermines the intelligibility of one’s projects, cares, and commitments, in a way that
amounts to a change in the structure of temporal experience.The paper concludes by briefly
addressing the implications of this for how we respond to trauma, as well as offering some
remarks on the relationship between trauma and psychosis.
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INTRODUCTION
The Istanbul Protocol, a United Nations guide for investigating
and documenting cases of torture, describes one of its long-term
effects as follows:
The victim has a subjective feeling of having been irreparably damaged
and having undergone an irreversible personality change. He or she
has a sense of foreshortened future without expectation of a career,
marriage, children, or normal lifespan (Istanbul Protocol, 1999, p. 47).
A “sense of foreshortened future” is also mentioned as a
symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in the fourth
edition of theDiagnostic and StatisticalManual ofMentalDisorders
(DSM-IV-TR, p. 468). In DSM-5, there is a more general state-
ment about various negative expectations concerning the future.
Here, we focus more specifically on the “foreshortened future” cri-
terion. What might the relevant experience consist of? The DSM
and Istanbul Protocol do not provide any further clarification, and
the cursory descriptions that they do offer are compatible with
various interpretations. On one account, a sense of foreshortened
future involves a cluster of interrelated judgments regarding what
the future most likely holds, such as “I will die young,” “I will
not have a family,” and “I will not have a successful career.” These
either comprise or originate in a more general evaluation of future
events, the content of which is something like “bad things are
going to happen to me and good things are not going to happen
to me.” In conjunction with this, negative emotions toward the
future predominate: one fears that p and q, rather than hoping
that r and s. If this is right, then a sense of foreshortened future
is to be distinguished from an experience of time itself or – if you
prefer – from an experience of temporal properties. The trauma-
tized person continues to distinguish past, present, and future, to
anticipate the arrival of future events, and to experience tempo-
ral passage. Regardless of whether she anticipates future event p,
where p is evaluated negatively (most notably, her own premature
death), or future event q, where q is evaluated positively, both
are experienced as “future” in the same way. So a foreshortened
future is a matter of what is anticipated, a negative evaluation of
what the future offers rather than an altered sense of the future
itself.
In contrast to that view, we will argue that the experience of
time is itself affected. Rather than a change in what is antici-
pated, arising against a backdrop of intact temporal experience,
there is an altered sense of temporal passage, of “moving forward”
in time, along with a change in how past, present, future, and
the relationship between them are experienced. Certain other
symptoms of trauma, such as “flashbacks” and feeling unable
to “move on” from what has happened, can also be understood
in terms of this. In what follows, we provide a phenomeno-
logical account, one that serves to illuminate the nature of a
poorly understood change in the overall structure of experi-
ence that sometimes (but not always) follows exposure to certain
events.
TORTURE AND TRAUMA
The experience addressed here is documented both as an effect
of torture and as a symptom of PTSD. The focus of our dis-
cussion therefore needs to be clearer. Definitions of torture are
contested. According to the Istanbul Protocol, it involves inflict-
ing mental or physical suffering in order to punish, intimidate,
obtain information, or extract a confession, and a public official
must be implicated1. Others reject the “public official” condition
as too restrictive. For instance, Kenny (2010) instead empha-
sizes the “instrumentality” of torture: suffering is intentionally
caused in order to elicit a behavioral response, in a situation
where the torturer has control over the victim2. The two psy-
chiatric diagnoses most often associated with the effects of torture
are major depression and PTSD, which are difficult to tease apart
when diagnosed together (Istanbul Protocol, 1999, p. 45). As it
1This can involve punishment for something the victim or someone else has done,
where the aim is to punish the victim and/or punish somebody else who cares about
the victim.
2See, for example, Peters (1996) for several different definitions of torture.
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is debatable what “torture” consists of and the kind of expe-
rience we describe is not unique to torture victims, it might
seem preferable to widen the scope of our enquiry to PTSD
and depression. However, the diagnostic category PTSD admits
considerable heterogeneity, and there are also high levels of
comorbidity with several other psychiatric conditions (DSM-IV,
p. 465). The same points apply to the category “major depres-
sion” (Ratcliffe, in press). Furthermore, some experiences of
trauma, such as “war trauma,” involve a wider range of symp-
toms than those associated with PTSD and/or major depression
(Ford, 1999; Hunt, 2010). Matters are further complicated by
the overlap between grief and trauma, given that grief some-
times involves bereavement by “traumatic means” (Neria and
Litz, 2004, p. 75). So it is unlikely that one or another psychi-
atric category will be reliably associated with a distinctive kind of
experience.
The experience we seek to characterize might be associated
with a diagnosis of PTSD, major depression or both, but is not
a prerequisite for either. It is better captured by the ICD-10
subcategory of “enduring personality change after catastrophic
experience,” the symptoms of which include “a hostile or mis-
trustful attitude toward the world,” “social withdrawal,” “feelings
of emptiness of hopelessness,” “a chronic feeling of being ‘on the
edge’, as if constantly threatened,” and “estrangement” (ICD-10,
p. 209). And it is also consistent with Judith Herman’s account of
what she calls “complex PTSD”or “disorders of extreme stress not
otherwise specified” (Herman, 1992/1997; Ford, 1999). However,
given that (a) the experience is not specific to any one psychi-
atric diagnosis, (b) many of the relevant diagnostic categories are
contested, and (c) all of these categories are also compatible with
other – often subtly different – kinds of experience, we do not
tie our subject matter to one or another diagnosis. Instead, we
focus on a certain kind of traumatic event, one where extreme
suffering is deliberately inflicted upon a person by others. This
is a necessary but not – according to most accounts –sufficient
condition for torture. Our discussion therefore applies equally to
the potential psychological effects of sexual assault, domestic vio-
lence, prejudicial discrimination, enforced periods of extended
solitary confinement, and other forms of physical and psycholog-
ical abuse, regardless of whether or not they are classified as forms
of torture.
In referring to “trauma” it is debatable whether the empha-
sis should be on events that are intrinsically traumatic according
to some criterion or whether any event that affects a given per-
son in the relevant way qualifies as “traumatic” in that instance.
However, our emphasis is on occurrences that would cause
almost anyone great distress, and so the distinction between
traumatic events and the traumatic effects of events is not so
pressing3. We thus refer to “traumatic events” and also to endur-
ing“traumatic experiences”or “experiences of trauma” that follow
them. Of course, people respond in different ways to traumatic
events, due to factors that include age, gender, idiosyncratic
dispositions, life history, interpersonal relationships, and how
3As suggested by ICD-10, in such cases it is “unnecessary to consider per-
sonal vulnerabilities in order to explain its profound effect on the personality”
(1992, p. 209).
events are interpreted and re-interpreted individually and cul-
turally. Furthermore, effects of traumatic events can be hard to
distinguish from effects of wider social and cultural upheavals, as
is often the case in refugee populations. The potentially differ-
ent effects of discrete traumatic events and repeated or chronic
exposure should also be kept in mind (Herman, 1992/1997; Ford,
1999)4.
So the kind of experience addressed here does not inevitably
follow interpersonal trauma and it is not exclusive to interpersonal
trauma. Nevertheless, there is something distinctive about the psy-
chological effects of harm inflicted by others. As Janoff-Bulman
(1992, p. 77) observes, being “singled out for injury [. . .] by
another person [. . .] presents particular challenges to the victim’s
assumptive world.”We consider the nature of these“challenges” to
one’s “assumptions.”We will first describe a pervasive shift in how
the person relates to others that can follow interpersonal trauma,
something that is often described as a “loss of trust.”We will sug-
gest that this centrally involves a pervasive alteration in how events
are anticipated, which – in the most extreme cases – renders a pur-
posive orientation toward a meaningful future unintelligible to the
person. This, we will further show, amounts to a profound shift in
the experience of time. As indicated by the emphasis upon “loss”
of trust, an important limitation of our analysis is that it concerns
cases where a previously intact (or largely intact) sense of trust is
disturbed by traumatic events. Hence we do not address the vari-
ous ways in which and degrees to which trust might be disrupted
and developmentally derailed before it is fully formed, as happens
when traumatic events occur during childhood. Although these
need to be considered separately, our account of what the relevant
kind of “trust” comprises will be applicable here too.
LOSS OF TRUST
A sense that the future is bereft of positive, meaningful life events
is equally a sense that one’s meaningful life is in the past, finished.
So remarks to the effect that the future has nothing to offer are
sometimes accompanied by the claim that one has died, that part
of one has died, or that one persists but no longer “lives:” “I felt
as though I’d somehow outlived myself” (Brison, 2002, p. 9). This
corresponds to a wider phenomenon that Freeman (2000, p. 90)
has called “narrative foreclosure,” defined as “the premature con-
viction that one’s life story has effectively ended: there is no more
to tell; there is no more than can be told.” It is not simply that
the person believes she does not have much time left; the trau-
matic event somehow disrupts her ongoing life story such that
the story ceases to be sustainable. (A “life story,” for current pur-
poses, is a meaningful, coherent interpretation of past activities,
relationships, achievements, and failures, which also includes a
sense of where one is heading – what one’s cares, commitments,
and projects currently consist of, and what one seeks to achieve.)
Even if something like this is right – and we think it is – it does
not tell us why a life story has collapsed. Let us consider three
scenarios:
4There are further complications in cases such as extended solitary confinement,
where harm is inflicted by others in the relevant way but chronic sensory and social
deprivation have additional effects on temporal experience. For recent discussions,
see Grassian (2006) and Guenther (2013).
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(1) Loss of a life narrative is constitutive of a sense of foreshort-
ened future.
(2) Loss of a life narrative is symptomatic of a loss of projects,
cares, and commitments upon which that narrative is
founded.
(3) Both (1) and (2) are symptomatic of losing something that
is presupposed by the intelligibility of life narratives and life
projects.
We doubt that a sharp distinction can be drawn between (1)
and (2), given that the ability to develop, sustain, and revise
projects and commitments plausibly incorporates the ability to
situate them within a cohesive, purposive, forward-looking nar-
rative, one that is told and retold to oneself and others. We do
not wish to deny that some instances of narrative foreclosure are
attributable largely or wholly to a combination of (1) and (2).
Life projects and commitments depend upon a wider social and
cultural environment, and are therefore vulnerable to collapse in
the event of certain changes in that environment. For example,
if universities ceased to exist after some major social upheaval,
a life focused around excelling as a University Professor would
be unsustainable. Numerous projects would collapse, along with
a broader, purposive narrative into which they are integrated; a
life story would be cut short. Lear (2006) describes how cultural
changes can lead to loss of meaning structures that the life-stories
and purposive activities of whole communities depend upon. This
amounts to a form of narrative foreclosure, a sense that meaning-
ful events can no longer transpire, that nothing can “happen.”
However, it is to be distinguished from a superficially similar but
importantly different kind of experience. Interpersonal trauma
can lead to narrative foreclosure even when the relevant social and
cultural structures remain largely intact. Indeed, re-establishing a
sense of connection with these structures has been identified as
an important goal of rehabilitation (Herman, 1992/1997). Fur-
thermore, trauma is often experienced as specific to oneself; it
is something that “I” and “I alone” – rather than “we” – have
endured and continue to endure. In such cases, it involves an iso-
lation from others that distinguishes it from shared meaning loss
(although the distinction is certainly not clear-cut, and the kind
of experience we describe can also involve shared meaning loss).
In at least some such cases, we will argue, what is lost is not just (1)
and/or (2) but also (3). In the type of case Lear describes, an open
and meaningful future remains; what is lacking is a more determi-
nate sense of which meaningful possibilities that future includes.
However, for some, even this much is lost. There is an alteration
in how time is experienced, such that the possibility of “moving
on” in any kind of purposive, meaningful way can no longer be
entertained. We will describe this by first turning to the theme of
“trust.”
First-person accounts of severe trauma, especially interper-
sonal trauma, tend to emphasize a “loss of trust.” There are
references to this in diagnostic manuals as well. For instance,
DSM-5 (p. 271) refers to “exaggerated negative beliefs” such as
“no one can be trusted” and “the world is completely danger-
ous.” But what, in this context, is “trust?” Trust is often construed
by philosophers as a three-place relation, of the form “x trusts
y to do z.” Hence the philosophical task becomes that of identi-
fying criteria which distinguish trusting y to do z from various
other attitudes, such as hoping that y will do z and thinking
that y will probably do z5. However, this does not exhaust the
scope of “trust.” Three-place trust can be distinguished from
two-place trust, where “x trusts y” full stop, without reference
to a specific situation or action. And there is also what we
might call “one-place trust,” where one trusts other people in
general rather than trusting a specific individual or group of
individuals: one “trusts y to do z” because one “trusts y,” and
one trusts y because one simply “trusts.” The latter might also
be described as “having trust” and is thus analogous to “hav-
ing hope,” something that need not relate to a specific hope
content.
One-place trust is seldom remarked upon in mundane, every-
day discourse. However, its loss is a conspicuous theme in
first-person accounts of traumatic experience. Itmight be objected
that the term “trust” is misleading here, as “trust” ordinarily refers
to the three-place and perhaps also the two-place relation, both of
which are quite different. But one-place trust is closely related to
the others: one must first have trust in order to trust y to do z or
to trust y more generally. On the other hand, that p is a condition
of possibility for q does not imply that p and q are of the same
kind. And nothing really hinges on whether we insist on the word
“trust.”One reason for retaining it is that people generally do refer
to what we describe as a form of “trust.”However, a host of related
terms are also at play. Jones (2004) calls it “basal security,” while
Herman (1992/1997) refers to “basic trust” but also to a sense of
“safety in the world.” Améry (1999, p. 47) describes an endur-
ing loss of “trust in the world” that he experienced after torture
and subsequent incarceration in Auschwitz, but also emphasizes
the broader theme of “security,” which includes an “entire field”
of related words, such as “loyal, familiar, confidence, to trust, to
entrust6.”
“Having trust”might be construed as a non-phenomenological
disposition to adopt certain attitudes and have certain kinds of
experience. But it also has a phenomenology in its own right;
“losing trust” involves losing a habitual confidence that more
usually permeates all experience, thought, and activity. It is some-
times described in terms of finding oneself in a different world,
a world where people in general seem somehow different: “the
entire world of people becomes suspect” (Janoff-Bulman, 1992, p.
79)7. Traumatic events are often said to “shatter” a way of experi-
encing the world and other people that was previously taken for
granted:
. . .we experience a fundamental assault on our right to live, on our per-
sonal sense of worth, and further, onour sense that theworld (including
people) basically supports human life. Our relationship with existence
5For example, Jones (2004, p. 6) offers the following analysis of three-place trust:
“trust is accepted vulnerability to another person’s power over something that one
cares about, where (1) the truster forgoes searching (at the time) for ways to reduce
such vulnerability, and (2) the truster maintains normative expectations of the
one-trusted that they do not use that power to harm what is entrusted.”
6See also Baier (1986), Stolorow (2007, 2011), and Bernstein (2011) for comple-
mentary descriptions of what we have called “one-place trust.”
7Experiences of depression are often described in these terms too. See Ratcliffe (in
press) for a detailed discussion.
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itself is shattered. Existence in this sense includes all the meaning struc-
tures that tell us we are a valued and viable part of the fabric of life
(Greening, 1990, p. 323).
What, exactly, does this “shattering” involve? It could be that
experiencing significant suffering at the hands of another person
leads to a negation of engrained beliefs such as “people do not
hurt each other for the sake of causing pain,” “people will help
me if I am suffering,” and so on. Then again, through our con-
stant exposure to news stories and other sources, most of us are
well aware that people seriously harm each other in all manner
of ways. One option is to maintain that we do not truly “believe”
such things until we endure them ourselves, and various references
to loss of trust as the overturning of deeply held “assumptions”
lend themselves to that view. For example, Herman (1992/1997, p.
51) states that “traumatic events destroy the victim’s fundamental
assumptions about the safety of the world,” and Brison (2002, p.
26) describes how interpersonal trauma “undermined my most
fundamental assumptions about the world.” An explicitly cogni-
tive approach, which construes these assumptions as “cognitive
schemas” or fundamental beliefs, is adopted by Janoff-Bulman
(1992, pp. 5–6), who identifies three such beliefs as central to one-
place trust: “the world is benevolent;” “the world is meaningful;”
and “the self is worthy.”
However, it seems implausible to insist that “x thinks that x
believes that p” when x actually believes not p until x is tortured
and really does come to believe that p. It could be argued that
the term “belief” encompasses more than one type of attitude. So
one a-believes that p but later comes to b-believe it too8. Another
option is to note that the belief “people have done p to other people
and will do so again” is distinct from “someone might do p to a
particular person, me.” Hence the deep-rooted belief that is over-
turned is of the form“p won’t (or even can’t) happen to me.”One,
the other or both might well be right, but it would be a mistake
to construe loss of one-place trust solely in these terms. Although
it clearly does involve changes in attitude toward oneself, other
people and the world more generally, it also involves something
more than this9. What is eroded, we suggest, is a habitual, non-
propositional style of anticipation, which cannot be exhaustively
characterized in terms of however many propositional attitudes of
the form “x believes that p.” It is something that a person could
describe in termsof thenegationof anynumberof different propo-
sitions, including “the world is safe,” “others will help me when I
am in trouble,” “people generally mean well,” “good things will
happen in the future,” “I will live a long time,” “there are worth-
while projects,” “I am worthy,” and “I have friends.” However,
such utterances do not just convey distinct, thematically related
belief contents. They are also used to express a unitary and more
enveloping phenomenological change, the nature of which can be
made clearer by emphasizing the theme of unpredictability:
8Alternatively, belief could be distinguished from an affective, practical responsive-
ness that usually accompanies it. For example, Gendler (2008) distinguishes “belief”
fromwhat she calls“alief.”Thosewho accept such a distinction can say that x believes
that p and that, following the traumatic event, x also comes to alieve that p.
9As Corbí (2012, p. 55) observes, a “certain kind of awareness of some facts, deeper
than mere knowledge of them, seems to be required to account for the conditions
under which our confidence in the world may be lost.”
Massive deconstruction of the absolutisms of everyday life exposes the
inescapable contingency of existence on a universe that is random and
unpredictable and in which no safety or continuity of being can be
assured (Stolorow, 2007, p. 16).
Many of us anticipate most things with habitual confidence. It
does not occur to us that we will be deliberately struck by a car
as we walk to the shop to buy milk or that we will be assaulted by
the stranger we sit next to on a train. There is a sense of security
so engrained that we are oblivious to it. Indeed, the more at home
we are in the world, the less aware we are that “feeling at home in
the world” is even part of our experience (Baier, 1986; Bernstein,
2011). It is not itself an object of experience but something that
operates as a backdrop to our perceiving that p, thinking that q
or acting in order to achieve r. To lose it is not just to endorse
one set of evaluative judgments over another. It is more akin to
losses of practical confidence that all of us feel on occasion, in
relation to one or another performance. Suppose, for instance,
one starts to “feel” that one can no longer teach well. Granted,
evaluative judgments have a role to play, but loss of confidence
need not originate in explicit judgments about one’s performance,
and its nature is not exhausted by however many judgments. The
lecture theater looks somehow different – daunting, oppressive,
unpredictable, uncontrollable. Along with this, one’s actions lack
their more usual fluidity and one’s words their spontaneity. The
experience is centrally one of feeling unable to engage in a habitual,
practical performance. And loss of confidence can remain resistant
to change even when one explicitly endorses propositions such as
“I am a good teacher.”
Such an experience can be fairly circumscribed, relating pri-
marily to certain situations. However, we suggest that human
experience also has a more enveloping “overall style” of anticipa-
tion. This view is developed in somedepthby thephenomenologist
Husserl (1991). According to Husserl, all of our experiences and
activities incorporate anticipation. He uses the term “protention”
to refer to an anticipatory structure that is integral to our sense
of the present. It is not “added on” to an independently consti-
tuted sense of what is present; our experience of an entity as
present includes anticipation. Husserl adds that a sense of the
immediate past is likewise inseparable from the present. When
something happens, we do not experience it as “present,” after
which it is “gone”or somehow“fades.”Experience includes“reten-
tions,” present experiences of events as having just past. The
experienced “flow” or “passage” of time involves a structured
interplay between protention and retention. An oft used exam-
ple is that of listening to a melody, where how one experiences a
present note is inseparable from a sense of what preceded it, of
where it has “come from,” as well as from some sense of what is
coming next.
The content of what is anticipated varies in its determinacy,
and Husserl (1948/1973) refers to this as “open uncertainty.” For
example, as one turns an object over, one might anticipate that its
hidden surface will be smooth and red, or one might just antic-
ipate a surface with some color and texture. He contrasts this
kind of uncertainty with “problematic uncertainty,” which takes
the form “p might not occur” or “what looks like p may not be p,”
regardless of how determinate p might be. There is also “doubt,”
which involves conflict between an earlier anticipation of p and a
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later, competing anticipation of “q and not p.” Husserl adds that
localized experiences of problematic uncertainty and doubt arise
against an enduring backdrop of habitual certainty. You might
doubt that something is what it seems, as when you look into the
distance from a station platform, take a far-away light to be that of
your approaching train, and then start to wonder whether it might
be something else. But here your experience of doubt is localized.
You continue to take it as given that your foot will land on a flat
surface as you take a step forward, that the coffee you are about
to sip will be warm, that others on the platform will behave in the
usual way, and so forth. For the most part, such expectations do
not take the form of explicit judgments. They are symptomatic
of a habitual, practical confidence, a feeling of being more gen-
erally “at home” in the world. It is against this backdrop that we
have more localized experiences of problematic uncertainty and
doubt, and make explicit judgments to the effect that event p will,
will not, or might not arise. Hence a non-localized sense of confi-
dence or certainty is not itself an attitude toward anything specific
but something that is already in place when such attitudes are
adopted10.
We can thus distinguish (a) the content of what is antici-
pated, which may be more or less determinate, from (b) the
mode of anticipation, which may be doubt or uncertainty but
is more usually certainty. We can add to Husserl’s account (c) the
affective “style” of anticipation. When we anticipate events that
matter to us in one or another way, we may do so with excite-
ment, hope, curiosity, fear, panic, or dread. Habitual certainty
has its own affective style: there is confident engagement with
what is coming next, of a kind that is incompatible with fearing
or dreading it. And, when we dread p (regardless of whether p
is anticipated in the mode of certainty, problematic uncertainty,
or doubt), we generally do so within a wider context of practical
confidence, in relation to which p is experienced as a localized
anomaly.
Were this style of anticipation to break down completely, we
could not anticipate localized conflicts in the modes of problem-
atic uncertainty or doubt, given that things appear potentially or
actually anomalous in these ways insofar as they are at odds with a
wider framework of coherent anticipation. Hence the result would
be a loss of experiential structure. What, though, if it were altered
in some distinctive way, rather than altogether lost? This, we pro-
pose, is what loss of one-place trust involves. A confident style of
anticipation gives way to pervasive and non-localized uncertainty
and doubt, and a sense of danger predominates. We can thus
see why someone might describe herself as living in a “different
world.” Recalling the example of the musical note, how we experi-
ence what is present is shaped by what we anticipate. The point can
be applied more specifically to the affective aspects of anticipation.
10There are interesting similarities between Husserl’s account of habitual certainty,
as something that our various beliefs about what is and is not the case presup-
pose, and some of the later Wittgenstein’s remarks concerning“hinge propositions.”
According to Wittgenstein, when we take something to be the case or otherwise,
we presuppose a different kind of certainty. Hinge propositions, he says, are not
“propositions” of a kind that we could take to be true or false; they are the “ground”
for judgments of truth and falsehood (Wittgenstein, 1975, p. 27). At times,Wittgen-
stein (1975, p.22, 66) describes this ground as a form of “trust” and emphasizes the
practical nature of the relevant kind of certainty. See Moyal-Sharrock (2005) for a
discussion of the role of trust in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.
When the realization of some indeterminate threat is anticipated,
things can “look” foreboding. And when the overall style of
anticipation takes this form, a sense of being confidently immersed
in the world, “at home” in it, is lost. One feels “uprooted;”
the world as a whole appears strangely and disturbingly
different.
INTERPERSONAL TRUST AS A SOURCE OF POSSIBILITY
Loss of confidence or “one-place trust” can take a number of
forms. When faced with chronic illness, one’s bodily experience
might involve a pervasive sense of what Carel (2013) calls “bodily
doubt;” one ceases to habitually “trust” one’s bodily capacities
and capabilities, and the default style of anticipation becomes
that of anxious uncertainty. Alternatively, it could be focused
upon the impersonal world; an environment that was previously
taken to be dependable now seems dangerous and unpredictable.
Or one might cease to trust one’s own abilities, perhaps even
the reliability and coherence of one’s own thoughts. Hence it
might be objected that the term “one-place trust” is mislead-
ing. Given that it can have different emphases, “trust in p,”
“trust in q,” and so on, it actually falls under the category “two-
place trust.” However, “having trust in the context of domain
p” is to be distinguished from “trusting p.” The former is not
a relation of trusting but a precondition for one or another
broad kind of trust relation. So, although one-place trust has
more circumscribed domains, it is not itself an attitude toward
something.
The concern could also be raised that “trust” properly applies
to the interpersonal domain and its extension to other forms of
practical confidence is inappropriate. In response, it should be
noted that the term “trust” is sometimes used in the more per-
missive way, and victims of trauma often refer to a wider-ranging
“loss of trust in the world.” Even so, we will now suggest that
having trust in other people has a kind of primacy over others
forms of one-place trust. This is because its loss also entails a more
general loss of confidence in oneself, one’s abilities, and one’s sur-
roundings. Furthermore, where trust in some other domain is
eroded, interpersonal trust more usually has an important role
to play in its restoration. In the absence of interpersonal trust,
other losses of trust are experienced as irrevocable rather than
contingent.
Relations with other people serve to shape and re-shape our
experiences and attitudes. Even mundane and short-lived inter-
personal interactions can be self-affecting. Whether an expression,
gesture, or comment is met with a smile or a dismissive sneer can
have a subtle but wide-ranging effect on experience of oneself,
the other person, and the surrounding environment. For this rea-
son, Løgstrup (1956/1997, p. 18) proposes that all interpersonal
relations involve unavoidable responsibility for others; we cannot
interact with someone without somehow affecting his “world:”
By our very attitude to one another we help to shape one another’s
world. By our attitude to the other person we help to determine the
scope and hue of his or her world; we make it large or small, bright or
drab, rich or dull, threatening, or secure. We help to shape his or her
world not by theories and views but by our very attitude toward him or
her. Here lies the unarticulated and one might say anonymous demand
that we take care of the life which trust has placed in our hands.
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According to Løgstrup, entering into any kind of interper-
sonal relationship involves a balance of trust and vulnerability.
To relate to someone in a distinctively personal way is to be
open to her potential influence on one’s world and thus vulner-
able to harm. In doing so, one trusts the other person not to
do harm – one’s life is “placed in her hands11.” Although that
might sound rather dramatic, the relevant phenomenon is famil-
iar and commonplace. Gallagher (2009) discusses how, as well
as making sense of others through our interactions with them,
we make sense of the world more generally. What we attend to
is regulated by others, and there is empirical evidence suggest-
ing that their presence alone serves to influence what we take
to be salient, how we evaluate it, and how we respond to it.
This applies from a very young age: “we learn to see things,
and to see them as significant in practices of shared attention”
(Gallagher, 2009, p. 303)12. What we take to be “salient” and
“significant” is inseparable from what we anticipate – from what
we think is likely to happen and how it matters. Hence inter-
actions with others can shape the content, mode, and affective
style of anticipation, in relation to however many features of the
environment.
Given that what and how we anticipate is inextricable from
our experience of what is present, our surroundings can “look”
different depending on whether we are interacting with others
and on what form the interaction takes. It is not so much a matter
of what the other person says; she need not say anything. It is
largely attributable to styles of interaction, to patterns of shared
attention, to howgestures and expressions are elicited and followed
up (although it can also involve the construction, elaboration, and
revision of self-narratives). van den Berg (1972, p. 65) offers the
following description:
We all know people in whose company we would prefer not to go
shopping, not to visit a museum, not to look at a landscape, because
we would like to keep these things undamaged. Just as we all know
people in whose company it is pleasant to take a walk because the
objects encountered come to no harm. These people we call friends,
good companions, loved ones13.
Interactions with others can thus facilitate changes in perspec-
tive, which are often subtle but occasionally quite profound. After
interacting for a prolonged period with a particular person, the
world might seem strangely impoverished or, alternatively, alive
with new possibilities. Hence the interpersonal serves to imbue
things with a sense of contingency. The anticipation of entering
into certain kinds of relation with others amounts to a sense that
“this is not all the world has to offer,” an appreciation that there
are other possibilities, however indeterminate those possibilities
might be.
Traumatic events can elicit a shift in the overall style of inter-
personal anticipation, in the balance between vulnerability and
trust. What makes interpersonal trauma distinctive is the sub-
version of interpersonal trust that it involves. The other person
11See Bernstein (2011) for an account along similar lines.
12See also Seemann (2009) for a complementary discussion of what he calls “basic”
interpersonal trust and the nature of joint agency.
13Similar descriptions are offered by various others. See, for example, Gendlin
(1978/2003, p. 115).
recognizes one’s vulnerability and responds to it not with care
but by deliberately inflicting harm. The aim of torture has been
described as the complete psychological destruction of a person:
“the torturer attempts to destroy a victim’s sense of being grounded
in a family and society as a human being with dreams, hopes and
aspirations for the future” (Istanbul Protocol, 1999, p. 45). It is a
“calculated assault on human dignity,” more so than an attempt
to extract information (Amnesty International, 1986, p. 172)14.
The victim is confronted by a kind of interpersonal relation that
exploits her vulnerability in an extreme way. Améry (1999, p. 29)
describes how, when one is hurt, there is ordinarily an “expec-
tation of help” from others, something that is engrained from
early childhood. Hence torture involves a radical conflict with
habitual styles of interpersonal anticipation. It is not just that
others fail to offer help; they are themselves the agents of harm
and there is nobody else to intervene on one’s behalf. Further-
more, many forms of torture involve taking familiar, homely items
that would more usually be encountered in a confident, purpo-
sive way, and using them to cause harm. For instance, household
utensils are sometimes used to inflict pain (Scarry, 1985, pp. 40–
41). So it is not just that an interpersonal situation fails to offer
what is habitually anticipated; it offers something utterly opposed
to it15.
Such experiences can lead to a shift in the vulnerability–trust
dynamic described by Løgstrup, whereby anticipation of harm
becomes a salient aspect of interpersonal experience, shaping all
interpersonal relations; one-place interpersonal trust is eroded or
lost16. Exactly how this comes about is debatable (andour aimhere
is to describe the resulting experience rather than the mechanisms
through which it arises). The victim might well form explicit judg-
ments to the effect that“the interpersonalworld is not as I took it to
be,”which in turn influence her overall style of anticipation. How-
ever, it is unlikely that the change in anticipatory style occurs solely
via this route. In many other contexts, conflicts between explicit
evaluative judgments and anticipatory style are commonplace. For
example, someonewho is bitten by a dogmay then experience dogs
as menacing and unpredictable, despite “knowing full well” that
the incident was anomalous. The point applies equally to the more
profound and pervasive effects of interpersonal trauma.
Loss of interpersonal trust has wider effects. Without the
assumption that others will offer assistance in moments of need,
the impersonal environment also seems less safe. What was once
14See also Scarry (1985) for a sustained argument to the effect that the aim of torture
is not to interrogate but to destroy the person. For a comprehensive and convincing
critique of the view that torture is an effective means of interrogation, see Costanzo
and Gerrity (2009).
15Extended periods of solitary confinement can similarly involve subversion of a
previously habitual anticipatory style. The person is deliberately starved of kinds of
interpersonal relation that were previously taken for granted, and the only kind of
social relation that remains is one of powerlessness in the face of an individual or
collective that deliberately inflicts harm (Guenther, 2013).
16It seems plausible to suggest that this outcome is more likely in certain scenarios
than others. For instance, where the harm is inflicted and/or endorsed by a group
rather than an individual, perhaps even state-sanctioned, this lends itself to the view
that people in general are suspect. It is also important to recognize the role of third-
parties. Corbí (2012) emphasizes the “secondary expectation” that, even when I am
harmed by someone, others will come to my aid. Their failure to do so, their refusal
to engage with what has happened and their even siding with the torturer in order
to maintain their own sense of confidence in others can all exacerbate a loss of trust.
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anticipated with habitual confidence is now anticipated with
uncertainty and dread:
When you think about everything on a deep level, [. . .] you see
that nothing in life follows any rules; you can’t rely on any-
thing to be always true, ever. Nothing is constant and nothing
is reliable, so nothing is “safe” to just simply believe in and be
done with it. You are constantly looking at everything around you
and re-assessing it, re-evaluating it as you get new information
about it17.
The point also applies to trust in one’s own abilities, even to the
reliability of one’s own judgments and thought processes. More
usually, where there is doubt we turn to others for reassurance and
support. Importantly, when trust in the impersonal environment
or in one’s own abilities is damaged, trusting relations with others
can help one to negotiate what has happened and move on. They
establish a sense of contingency, opening up new possibilities, and
facilitating new interpretations. When interpersonal trust is lost,
the prospect of entering into an interpersonal process that might
otherwise have enabled a shift in anticipatory style is lost along
with it. As Laub (2001, p. xv) observes,
. . .. . ..the survivor of torture feels completely alone. He – or
she – no longer believes in the very possibility of human connec-
tion; he envisages no one who will be present to him and for
him if he returns in his mind to the places of horror, humilia-
tion, and grief from which he barely emerged and which continue to
haunt him.
Consequently, one’s predicament is not experienced as a con-
tingent one; the world no longer offers anything else. The resultant
experience can also involve a sense of revelation, as a confidence
so deep-rooted that it was never questioned reveals itself as utterly
misplaced18. This further exacerbates the experience of alienation
from others. Even when someone else is not encountered as threat-
ening, he resides somewhere else, in a place where innocence
remains and people go about their business in a confident – albeit
naïve – way.
LOSS OF A MEANINGFUL FUTURE
Projects, cares, and concerns are sustained interpersonally. Almost
all goal-directed activities implicate other people in some way –
one is asked to do things by others and for others, and one does
so in collaboration with others. The integrity of one’s projects
therefore depends on the integrity of those relations. Where there
is pervasive uncertainty, where others cease to be dependable,
where the world is unsafe and one’s own abilities are in doubt,
projects collapse. It is not just that the person lacks something
that is presupposed by the possibility of a specific project. What is
missing is something that the intelligibility of projects in general
depends upon. One finds oneself in a world from which the pos-
sibility of meaningful, progressive, goal-directed activity is absent.
Other kinds of concern are affected in other ways. For instance,
17This testimony is taken froma questionnaire study,whichwas conducted as part of
AHRC- and DG-funded project“Emotional Experience in Depression”and ethically
approved by the Durham University Philosophy Department Research Committee.
This respondent (no. 179) had diagnoses of depression and PTSD.
18Stolorow (2007, p. 16) describes this as a “catastrophic loss of innocence that
permanently alters one’s sense of being-in-the-world.”
care for certain other people may endure, but a pervasive sense
of the world as unsafe and unpredictable renders it fragile and
vulnerable. One inhabits a place that is inhospitable to human
relationships. Interpersonal care is thus coupled with the anticipa-
tion of impending and inevitable loss, with dread, and anticipatory
grief.
Such an experience has a profound effect upon one’s beliefs.
Beliefs involving positive evaluations of future events in relation
to ongoing projects cease to be intelligible, given that such projects
have collapsed. In addition, one ceases to anticipate the future with
habitual confidence and no longer takes it to be the case that “p
will happen” or “q will happen;” everything seems less certain.
There is also a more widespread effect upon one’s beliefs. Various
factual beliefs that were once asserted with confidence may now
seem hollow, irrelevant, and alien, given that their relevance and
significance depended upon projects that have been lost. More
generally, there is a change in the way one believes; things are no
longer taken to “be the case” with a sense of confident certainty.
That kind of certainty is gone from the world, and nothing stands
firm in the way it once did. Furthermore, other people cannot
be relied upon for testimony and correction of errors, and one’s
own intellectual abilities are experienced as all the more suspect
without their reassurance.
A person’s philosophical beliefs are not insulated from these
phenomenological changes. Some of them, perhaps even the
vast majority, presuppose a confidence that is “shattered” in
trauma. When the confidence that one’s philosophical projects
depend upon is lost, one can still utter various propositions
and argue over them, but the activity takes on an air of absur-
dity. The seeming irrelevance of much philosophical discourse
following traumatic experience is noted by Brison (2002, p. x),
herself an academic philosopher: “when I was confronted with
something strange and paradoxical, philosophy was of no use
in making me feel at home in the world19.” As both Husserl
(1948/1973) and Wittgenstein (1975) suggest (in different ways,
admittedly), the possibility of believing that p or believing that
not p depends upon a different kind of confidence. We suggest
that, when that confidence is disturbed, one does not believe
in quite the same way anymore. A form of enquiry concerned
with whether we should believe that p or that q is irrelevant
when something presupposed by that kind of believing is itself
in jeopardy20.
A change in the style of anticipation and conviction, of the
kind that renders projects unsustainable, also amounts to a change
in the short-term and longer-term sense of time. In the case of
short-term time, there is a shift in the structure of protention.
One’s style of anticipation is bereft of certain kinds of possibil-
ity, such as that of something happening that matters in a good
way, or – more specifically – something that builds upon what one
has achieved up to now. Hence there is a change in the experi-
ence of what we might call temporal “flow” or “passage,” which
19See also Corbí (2012, p. 45).
20In a stronger statement, Améry (1999, p. 19) contrasts the reality of life in
Auschwitz with the attempts by some of those in the camp to sustain intellec-
tual debates: “to reach out beyond concrete reality with words became before our
very eyes a game that was not only worthless and an impermissible luxury but also
mocking and evil.”
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no longer involves the anticipation and actualization of certain
meaningful kinds of possibility. With this, the person is no longer
“moving forward,” “heading somewhere,” and so there is also an
altered sense of temporal direction. The longer-term sense of time
is also very different. When the person looks ahead, the future
lacks structure; it is not ordered in terms of meaningful projects,
and so a coherent sense of long-term duration is absent. Hence
the all-enveloping dread she feels before some inchoate threat is
not situated in relation to a wider pattern of meaningful temporal
events. There is nothing meaningful between now and its actual-
ization, and so it seems imminent. A loss of interpersonal trust
that is central to this form of experience is also what sets it in
stone. Without the possibility of entering into trusting relations
with others, the predicament seems unchangeable. There is no
access to the process that might otherwise reveal its contingency
and allow her to move beyond it. The person is isolated from oth-
ers in a way that is incompatible with “moving forward in time;”
her life story has been cut short.
This experience is not just future-oriented; it also affects how
one’s past is experienced. Past activities and events are significant
insofar as they relate to where one is going, insofar as they are
further developed, compensated for, or left behind. The past is
thus constantly renegotiated, reinterpreted:
. . .the future is the site of both anticipation and the unexpected, plan-
ning and the changing of plans. This predominant orientation toward
a changing future also means a fluid or unfixed past, because the past
is continually being reassessed as one moves into the future (Havens,
1986, p. 21).
When the possibility of moving forward in a purposive, pro-
gressive, structured way is absent, so is that of reinterpreting
one’s past. So we can also see why traumatic memories might be
experienced as vivid, intrusive flashbacks, why they are “relived”
more so than “recalled” (e.g., Hunt, 2010, p. 70). The trau-
matic event is not contextualized or re-interpreted in relation
to where one is heading, because the kind of trust required to
move on has been lost. This is not to suggest that a traumatic
memory endures as a wholly unadulterated record of how the
traumatic event was experienced at the time. Our point is that it
is not contextualized in the way that remembered events more
usually are. This may also account for the intrusive nature of
traumatic memories. As they are not integrated into a coher-
ent life story, the person does not first recall another, related
part of the story and – in the process – anticipate their com-
ing. They are “triggered” or “cued” in a different manner and arise
without prior context. To speculate further, difficulties in recall-
ing traumatic memories may equally be attributable to this lack
of contextualization. That they are not integrated into a struc-
tured life narrative makes them harder to actively recall or –
alternatively – easier to avoid21. Other memories of events prior
to the trauma are interpreted and re-interpreted, but only up
to that point. A life story therefore seems complete, cut short
21There are potential implications here for our understanding of dissociation in
trauma. The term “dissociation” is used to refer to various different kinds of expe-
rience and to different aspects of an experience. For example, it sometimes refers
to a sense of “derealization” and/or a feeling of detachment from one’s own body,
both of which are integral to the loss of trust that we have described. The person
feels disconnected from the world, as it no longer appears practically significant in
by something that the person continues to confront but cannot
negotiate22.
Hence a sense of foreshortened future is not a judgment to
the effect that the remainder of one’s life will be short and that
one has little or nothing to look forward to. It is a change in
how time is experienced: an orientation toward the future that is
inseparable from one’s experience of past and present, and also
from the short- and long-term “passage” of time, is altered. It is
not just that one will no longer get married, have children or have
a successful career. One confronts a world that is incompatible
with the possibility of an open and progressive life story23. And so
traumatized people sometimes describe themselves as having died
or say that a part of them has died: “when trust is lost, traumatized
people feel that they belong more to the dead than to the living”
(Herman, 1992/1997, p. 52).
This can be conceived of in terms of what Heidegger
(1927/1962) calls “being-toward-death.” Joseph Rouse, in a con-
ference paper on John Haugeland’s interpretation of Heidegger,
develops the point that being-toward-death or “existential death”
involves anticipating something that is distinct from biological
death24. Existential death, Rouse explains, “is not an actual event,
but a comportment toward the ever-impendingpossibility of [our]
own impossibility.” In other words, it is the recognition of the
potential unintelligibility of something that the intelligibility of all
our projects, cares and commitments depend upon, of something
the way it once did – she is not quite “there.” And, insofar as she lacks certain feel-
ings of anticipation and associated bodily dispositions, insofar as she is no longer
practically and habitually immersed in situations, her body may feel strangely inan-
imate and alien too. However, where “dissociation” arises in relation to memory,
a different account is required. What we have described in this section could be
regarded as a form of dissociation – decontextualized memories are experienced
as both estranged and estranging, and the person may also have trouble accessing
them. But a different kind of “dissociation” is involved when the person manages
to retain trust in the world and move forward by not confronting or engaging in
any way with what has happened. The resultant experience would be quite unlike
what we have focused upon in this paper, but the traumatic memory would sim-
ilarly remain detached from a life story. It is debatable whether and when this
latter kind of dissociation is adaptive, protecting one from a collapse of trust of the
kind we have described, and when it is itself part of the problem. That these two
different kinds of “dissociation” may be implicated in trauma complicates discus-
sion of the link between dissociation and “reality discrimination” (see, e.g., Varese
et al., 2012a). Some forms of post-traumatic dissociation may be symptomatic of
finding oneself in a “different world” while others involve the preservation of one’s
world.
22Stolorow (2011, p. 55) describes such an experience as follows: “experiences
of emotional trauma become freeze-framed into an eternal present in which
one remains forever trapped, or to which one is condemned to be perpetually
returned.[. . ..] In the region of trauma, all duration or stretching along collapses;
past becomes present, and future loses all meaning other than endless repetition.”
23The changes in temporal experience that we have described overlap with how
some people with depression diagnoses experience time. In both cases, there is a
closed past, a future that offers only threat, and no sense of meaningful transition
between past, present or future (Ratcliffe, 2012). Something that distinguishes an
experience of trauma is the sense that a past which was meaningful and perhaps
continues to be remembered as meaningful has been cut short by some event. Along
with this, one “relives” the event, confronts something that cannot be negotiated.
However, the distinction is difficult to draw in cases of sustained trauma, which
often originate in childhood, where the person either never gained trust in the first
place or lost it in a way that cannot be pinned down to a particular event.
24Rouse’s paper, entitled “Love and Death,” was presented at “Mind, Meaning
and Understanding: A Conference in Honor of John Haugeland” (University of
Chicago, Chicago, May 2010) and is available at: https://wesfiles.wesleyan.edu/
home/jrouse/Love%26Death.doc (accessed 4th April 2014).
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that many of us are oblivious to in the course of everyday life.
The most extreme form of traumatic experience can be thought
of as the actualization of existential death within a continuing
conscious life. One’s life is experienced as having ended because
its conditions of intelligibility have collapsed. This, we suggest, is
how remarks about having died should sometimes be understood:
“for months after my assault, I had to stop myself saying (what
seemed accurate at the time), ‘I was murdered in France last sum-
mer’ ” (Brison, 2002, p. xi)25. There are two distinct ways in which
the actualization of “existential death” might be construed. Our
activities are intelligible within wider-reaching projects and so the
potential unintelligibility of those activities is intelligible in the
guise of losing the relevant projects. Indeed, human lives are pep-
pered with project-deaths; a project can collapse for a variety of
reasons, rendering some but not all of one’s activities unintelligi-
ble, after which one is often able to move on. However, existential
death can – and should – be construed more strongly in terms
of the loss of something that is presupposed by the intelligibility
of any project, and this is what is occurs in some experiences of
interpersonal trauma. A life story is over not because some set
of projects that are fundamental to one’s life has been lost but
because the possibility of engaging in any such project has been
lost along with them. This, we stress, is an extreme form of the
experience, and a trusting style of anticipation can be eroded to
varying degrees.
CONCLUSION
We concede that experiences of trauma are heterogeneous and
that diagnoses such as PTSD are compatible with a range of
subtly different predicaments. Even so, our account suggests a phe-
nomenological unity to various symptoms thatmight otherwise be
regarded as closely related but distinct. The DSM-IV-TR descrip-
tion of PTSD includes the following symptoms (along with several
others): “impaired affect modulation,”“feelings of ineffectiveness,
shame, despair, or hopelessness,” “feeling permanently damaged,”
“a loss of previously sustained beliefs,”“social withdrawal,”“feeling
constantly threatened,” “impaired relationships with others,” and
“a change from the individual’s previous personality characteris-
tics.” Feeling threatened, socially withdrawn, and unable to relate
to others can all be construed in terms of losing interpersonal
trust. The same applies to impaired affect regulation: the person
cannot participate in interpersonal relations of a kind that more
usually serve to regulate experience, thought, and activity. We have
also suggested that loss of trust has a profound effect on what a
person believes and the way in which she believes. In addition, loss
of trust amounts to a sense that one’s life story has been cut short
and therefore to a feeling of being irreparably “damaged.” There
are perhaps two aspects to feeling ineffective: (i) loss of interper-
sonal trust disposes one to lose trust in one’s own abilities; (ii) in a
world where meaningful action is impossible, one is unable to do
anything of consequence, something that might be expressed in
terms of ineffectiveness. And all of this surely amounts to a sub-
stantial “personality change.” Hence empathizing with extreme
25“Existential death,” as we have described it, relates closely to what others have
referred to as “social death” or “social murder,” construed as a radical form of social
disenfranchisement that is incompatible with sustaining a meaningful human life
(Bernstein, 2011; Guenther, 2013).
traumatic experiences (where “empathy” is understood in a non-
committal way as coming to understand an experience, rather than
as trying to somehow“experience it in a first-personway”) involves
coming to appreciate a profound and unitary phenomenological
change, one that does not concern however many experiences of p
and attitudes toward q but an overall style of experience that they
presuppose.
It is also important to emphasize the interpersonal, social, and
cultural aspects of trauma. We have argued that traumatic expe-
rience is essentially a way of relating to people in general. How
specific others and others in general respond to one’s experience
may serve to mitigate or exacerbate the loss of trust that is so
central to it. Turning first of all to exacerbation, our approach
can contribute to an understanding of the link between trauma
and psychosis (Istanbul Protocol, 1999, p. 47). We have empha-
sized the indispensable regulatory roles that other people play, how
our relations with them shape our experiences, thoughts, projects,
goals, and life stories. Given this, the development of psychosis
following trauma is not to be construed solely or even principally
in terms of processes that are internal to an individual. Our beliefs
are shaped by our interactions with others, who provide reas-
surance and correction. So a pervasive estrangement from other
people affects the ways in which beliefs are formed, maintained,
and revised. This kind of view is hinted at but not fully devel-
oped by Jaspers (1963, p. 104), who observes that our beliefs are
integrated into a public world, to which the status “incorrigible”
usually attaches. This sense of being embedded in a dependable,
predictable, public world can be altered by traumatic events, such
that a certain kind of conviction, a way of believing, is altered.
As Jaspers adds, “socially accepted reality totters, people become
adrift.” The point can be extended from belief-formation to how
we experience our surroundings, even to our ability to distinguish
what is physically present from what is not. Guenther (2013, p.
146) offers the following remarks, in relation to extreme forms of
social privation that prisoners in long-term solitary confinement
are subjected to:
We rely on a network of others, not just to survive or to keep ourselves
entertained but also to support our capacity to make sense of the world,
to distinguish between reality and illusion, and even to tell where our
own bodily existence begins and ends.
It is arguable that post-traumatic estrangement from oth-
ers and complete loss of felt interpersonal connection can
similarly serve to erode one’s sense of what is real, and of
the boundaries between self, other people, and the surround-
ing world, in a way that renders one susceptible to symp-
toms such as hallucinations and delusions. We can add to
this that loss of trust in the world involves a pronounced
and widespread sense of unpredictability. This unpredictabil-
ity, further cultivated by increasing social isolation, may ren-
der a person susceptible to further disturbances in the style
of anticipation26. Hence it would be interesting to explore
26There is increasing recognition that affective disturbances are implicated in psy-
chosis (e.g., Smith et al., 2006). See Morrison et al., 2003 for the view that there
is considerable overlap between the symptoms of psychosis and trauma, that
they interact causally in a range of ways, and that interpersonal processes have
a role to play. See also Earnshaw (2011) for the view that progressive erosion of
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how an all-enveloping loss of trust relates to and perhaps
contributes to “salience dysregulation” of the kind linked to
psychosis, where things appear significant in anomalous and
unstructured ways (Kapur, 2003; Kapur et al., 2005). Of course,
not all severely traumatized people go on to develop psy-
chosis, and different trajectories as well as prior vulnerabil-
ities need to be considered (Herman, 1992/1997). Even so,
where psychosis does arise in the context of trauma, our
account suggests that an interpersonal, rather than intrap-
ersonal, process is at work. The point applies equally
to other trajectories that traumatic experience might fol-
low.
With regard to mitigation, successful therapy can involve
changing the person’s sense of what others have to offer, in a
way that facilitates re-integration into the public world. Herman
(1992/1997) describes three broad stages of recovery: a local-
ized sense of safety is first nurtured, after which the person can
attempt to construct a narrative around what has happened, and
finally there is reengagement with communal life. What we have
said is consistent with this general approach. To begin with, cer-
tain possibilities may not even make sense to the person. So
encouraging her to do various things, adopt certain attitudes, or
change her perspective on life is analogous to encouraging her
to swim to safety when she finds herself stranded on a desert
planet with no prospect of escape. Given that trust is a precon-
dition for even entertaining certain possibilities, a degree of trust
first needs to be restored27. This is not to suggest that a victim
of interpersonal trauma can ultimately recover the same style of
unreflective trust that previously permeated her world. But she
can come to relate to others and to the world more generally
in a way that is compatible with moving forward into an open
future28.
trust is involved in the development of psychosis. See Varese et al. (2012b) for a
meta-analysis pointing to the conclusion that traumatic events during childhood
significantly increase the risk of psychosis. There is also a more specific link between
childhood trauma and “hallucination-proneness” (Varese et al., 2012a). As stressed
earlier, we have not addressed childhood trauma in this paper. The emphasis on
trust is likely to prove equally central here, but an important difference is that trust
in others, and in the world more generally, is disrupted during its formation, rather
than later “shattered.” This requires further discussion, as does the issue of how
childhood trauma can render one more vulnerable to further loss of trust in later
life. Childhood trauma has been linked to a range of different psychiatric diagnoses
in adulthood (Read et al., 2005).
27See also Janoff-Bulman (1992) for an emphasis on the substantial role that social
support has to play and for distinctions between various complementary types of
social support.
28The phenomenological study of trauma also has potential implications for philo-
sophical approaches to temporal experience. Philosophers often characterize the
experience of “temporal flow” or “passage” in a cursory way, after which discussion
turns to the issue of whether anymind-independent temporal properties correspond
to an experience of flow. For example, Paul (2010) refers simply to an experience of
“newness” and “passage” and concludes that our brains create the illusion of “flow.”
(See Hoerl, 2014, for a good discussion of this and similar approaches, and of prob-
lems involved in even making sense of the view that we have an illusory experience of
passage.) Before drawing such conclusions, it is advisable to formulate a sufficiently
detailed and nuanced account of one’s subject matter. Along with various others,
Paul (2010, p. 346) assumes that an “experience of passage” is to be identified with
one of “change.”However, consideration of temporal experience in trauma indicates
that matters are not so clear. The traumatized person continues to register “change.”
Even so, her sense of the transition between past, present and future is profoundly
altered and she no longer experiences herself as “moving forward” in time, as her
experience of temporal transition is no longer one of meaningful transition. The
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